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We examine xenophobia from the perspective of the unconscious of individuals, groups and nations, emphasizing
the role of fantasy, and arguing that some leaders use xenophobic discourse to exploit fantasies arising from emotions
such as anxiety, fear and anger. We discuss this in the context of the public sphere as conceptualized by Habermas. We
illustrate this with reference to an analysis of the psychic life of ‘Brexit’, the UK decision to exit the EuropeanUnion in
2016, arguing that Brexit was one expression of the unconscious life of a nation. We contribute to our understanding
of xenophobia and the role of psychodynamic forces within the public sphere by highlighting the key role of the
unconscious and its ability to be influenced by leaders. We conclude by reflecting on how we might work to counter
xenophobia and its fantasies.
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Introduction: xenophobia and the
unconscious
Xenophobia is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary
as the ‘deep antipathy to foreigners and foreign things’.
It reflects a sense of individual, group and national identity
narrowly defined in terms of an ethnocentrism (Levine
and Campbell, 1972) that generates intolerance and
aggressive rejection of those perceived as not belonging
to your national group, manifested in the tendency of
individuals and groups to identify with in-groups and
reject out-groups. The aim of our paper is to present an
argument for considering the important role of the
unconscious in creating and sustaining xenophobia. We
begin by considering unconscious drivers of individual
and public behaviour such as fantasies concerning the self
and others. We then examine the role of these forces in the
public sphere. We focus on this dynamic in an
examination of the unconscious forces at play in Brexit,
the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union.
Finally, we tentatively suggest how we might learn to
manage better the unconscious drivers that impact our
public sphere.
Our argument is influenced by psychodynamically
derived political and social analysis, particularly
psychoanalysis, which argues that ethnocentrism,
xenophobia and racism have their origins in deep-rooted
emotions such as anxiety, fear and anger and fantasies,
expressive of unconscious conflicts and desires
(Auestad, 2013). Butler (1997) describes this process as
part of the ‘psychic life of power’. Our psychic life, she
argues, is, in part, generated by the social operation of
power mediated by the discourses of those who hold and
define power: ‘power that at first appears as external,
pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into
subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes
the subject’s self-identity’ (Butler, 1997, p. 3).
Anderson (2006, p. 9) suggests that nations are haunted
by ‘ghostly national imaginings’ and argues that these
tend to become more extreme when we experience events
that are perceived as forms of national trauma, for
example, economic decline and war. As Young-
Bruehl (2013, pp. 46–47) describes it, ‘a society provides
the individuals who constitute it with a protective shield or
shields and there are traumas that breach these shields of
existential belonging and social care or service and
political union’. Social trauma is akin to individual trauma
which reignites feelings based on events, real or imagined,
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in the past, in particular feelings of helplessness and
betrayal by those responsible for caring for us or feelings
of our own inadequacy or insignificance (Freud, 1921).
People react to trauma with fear and/or anger. Hostility
to the other is frequently presented at a group/national
level in terms of danger to the body, for example, the
‘body politic’. The other brings with him/her the danger
of pollution, of impurity, of sickness, of poisoning of that
which is fantasied as pure (Douglas, 2002). The idea of the
nation as mother being polluted by racial impurity was a
central tenet of national socialism and Nazi propaganda.
The xenophobic impetus is to reject the foreign body
and to re-establish a sense of wholeness and continuity
with an unsullied past (Eriksen, 2002). The pure object
is idealized as the other is denigrated, demonized even,
rejected and excluded. Freud (1921) sees this as a form
of narcissism.
Leadership has an important role to play in encouraging
or in resisting xenophobia. Much of the literature on
leadership has tended towards the functional with
arguments for the importance of heroic charismatic and
transformational leaders as agents of change in public
and private sectors (Kotter, 1996), setting ‘bold
aspirations’, making ‘tough decisions’ as a recent report
by the leading management consultancy McKinsey
(Cohen et al., 2019) describes. However, given the
prevalence of negative leadership behaviour – for
example, during the banking crisis and by those in public
life – there is a growing interest in the dark side of
leadership (de Vries, 2018) and the ‘dark triad traits’
(narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy)
exhibited by some who have risen to positions of power
(Rauthmannm and Kolar, 2012). Our analysis suggests
that we might even consider xenophobia as an addition
to the triad of dark traits.
Leadership in the public sector can be especially
difficult if we accept that in the public sphere we are
lacking easy answers due to the complexity of many
issues concerning public life (Heifetz, 1998). We
contend that one of the defining features of political
leadership in recent times has been the recourse to a
discourse of xenophobia to focus and simplify
arguments about complex issues by appeal to people’s
darker emotions that are driven by the unconscious to
gain political leverage.
The unconscious
A key assumption of psychoanalysis is that the
unconscious plays a key role in social and individual life
(Gabriel, 2011). The unconscious is the source of fantasies
about ourselves and others and the emotional drive of the
unconscious is an important factor in behaviour. The
relationship between leaders and followers, for example,
can be understood as rooted as much in emotion as in logic
and reason. Groups exhibit strong emotional ties based
upon shared fantasies of the way they would like the
world to be which can prove impervious to the logic of
scientific argument and evidence (Freud, 1921). Groups
can identify strongly with leaders and idealize them
(Bion, 1961) while leaders can exploit the emotionality
of individuals and groups for their own ends.
The issue of the relationship between individual and
social psychodynamics was a key concern of Freud in
his later writings such as The future of an illusion (1927)
and Civilization and its discontents (1930). In the latter,
he argues that the individual perception of the social world
emerges out of unresolved infantile psychological conflict
in which the ‘other’ is identified as a threat because the
source of the frustration of desire. The individual pleasure
principle, the egoistic drive for pleasure, finds itself at
odds with the reality principle, an unwilling
acknowledgment that others will frequently frustrate our
demands. To cope with this we generate a variety of forms
of illusion and fantasy (Freud, 2008).
Psychoanalysis has made significant contributions to
the study of organizations not least in illuminating the
unconscious forces that can drive behaviours (Stein, 2003;
Fotaki et al., 2012; Stein, 2016; Arnaud and
Vidaillet, 2018; Vince, 2019). A psychodynamic
perspective focuses on the power of fantasy to obscure
reason. Laplanche and Pontalis (2018, p. 314) define
fantasy as an ‘imaginary scene in which the subject is
the protagonist, representing the fulfilment of a wish (in
the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that
is distorted to a greater or lesser extent by defensive
processes’.
Our lives are shaped by emotion as much as by reason
and by the psychic defences we adopt to protect ourselves
from the consequences of negative experience reignited in
our fantasy lives. In times of high emotion, of anxiety, fear
or anger, for example, we risk a return of the repressed
aspects of our inner lives dominating our ability to
respond to the present. We grow psychologically to the
extent that we can acknowledge and learn from this
(Winnicott, 1999). Conversely, to the extent that we fail
to complete this psychological work of adaptation, we
run the risk of regression and behaviour that repeats the
unresolved unconscious dynamics of our earlier lives.
An important part of the psychodynamics of self is the
tendency to dissociate from those parts of the self that we
find unacceptable. We tend to project our negative
fantasies onto others, blaming them for our problems
(Petriglieri and Stein, 2012). Our capacity for responding
effectively to change is jeopardized by unrecognized
and deeply rooted defences (Miller, 1985). The
psychodynamic challenge for individuals and groups is
to create a sense of self and of the world that sustains us
emotionally by making our libidinal and our aggressive
drives manageable.
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Social conflicts reflect our own unresolved inner
conflicts and the aggression that derives from the
frustration of being unable to adapt a realistic sense of
what is possible. Freud frames this as a conflict between
Eros and Thanatos, a life instinct deriving from our
propensity to develop close positive human relations,
and a death instinct, driven by aggression and a belief in
what the philosopher Thomas Hobbes saw as a natural
pre-civilized state of a war of all against all. Normal
human unhappiness, Freud (2004) argues, comes from
the acceptance of culture involving a renunciation of
instinct.
In times of change, when our sense of self is
undermined by the uncertain and the unexpected,
unconscious fantasy can take hold of individuals and
groups. In Freudian terms (Freud, 1962) the id and its
repressed desires, its reaction to fear and anger,
overwhelm the ego’s capacity for self-regulation. What
is particularly dangerous at this point is that we become
overwhelmed by destructive fantasy focused on the other
as the source of all our negative emotions and experiences.
We project on to them our rage and despair (Klein, 1975),
incapable of tolerating our unease, with fantasy
overwhelming our ability to create higher order meanings
of reconciliation with others perceived to be sharing our
fate rather than causing it. The other is seen as cause of
our problems and, in our unconscious, becomes the source
of and victim of our fantasies (Bion, 1962).
Unscrupulous leaders exploit the psychic life of their
followers by appeals to their unconscious emotions and
desires, feeding in particular their anxieties, shaping these
through leadership discourse. This, in both the case of
both leader and follower, is a way of dealing with
existential challenges felt deep in their lives that are
projected onto the other. Identifying with the leader’s
discourse brings relief in the way described by
Elliott (1996, p. 137) ‘the mind is emptied of pain through
the defensive use of omnipotent thinking and denial, and
the self is fixed through an ideological framing (familial,
religious, nationalistic and so forth) of what the world is
really like’.
A major cause of psychic distress is something that
disrupts the narcissistic sense of self-worth. Narcissism
feeds on an unrealistic view of one’s own power invested
in a fixed form of identity that becomes brittle when
challenged. To the extent that leaders feed anxiety, feed
on anxiety, and offer hope, false or otherwise, of creating
actions that will alleviate pain, the power and mastery
attributed to them will be strengthened. Leaders promise
to make good what their followers feel they have lost,
providing reassurance and thus binding their followers to
them in a dependent relationship where the leader is
invested with the power to perform what followers feel
they cannot. But this is dangerous because it gives a false
sense of certainty and resolution when, in complex
situations, a capacity to tolerate confusion and anxiety is
necessary for reflective political thinking and judgement
(Elliott, 1996).
Powerful emotion drives out considered and rational
decision-making. Leaders and followers are united by
their fantasies. ‘The emotional register through which
the underpinning fantasies of the regime function thus
makes the ethos of the regime less open to thorough-going
critique’ because fantasy, driven by unconscious tensions
and conflicts, ‘outstrips the psychical potency of
rationality’ (Tie, 2004, pp. 163–164). Emotions such as
anxiety and envy predominate and we tend to approach
the world with aggression born of paranoid anxiety
(Klein, 1986). We see the world as peopled with hostile
and frightening figures because we project these emotions
onto others. Leaders imbued with one or more of the dark
traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism or psychopathy,
and with an exaggerated sense of their own power and
capabilities, capitalize on the fears of their followers
(Fotaki and Harding, 2012).
Particularly dangerous are those leaders who feel that
it is their destiny to make history, that it is their role to
express their own intrinsic mastery by imposing their
fantasy of order and leading their followers into the
brave new world they imagine. Followers exorcize their
sense of impotence by projecting their desire for power
onto their chosen leader. The fantasy of omnipotence
manifests itself in the discourse of leaders with an
over-developed sense of their personal power, their
rightness and their vision. A significant danger for
leaders is that they become trapped in narcissistic
fantasy myths of a special destiny that makes them blind
to their own limits (Kayes, 2006).
The social function of civilization, Freud (2008) argues,
is the social regulation of relationships by coercion of
various kinds to promote discipline by imposing
instinctual renunciation. ‘Regulation means coercion of
the individual, anarchic and rebellious by nature, by the
power of the community’ (Lothane, 2012, p. 526).
Richard (2011, p. 2), analysing present-day forms of
discontent with culture from a Freudian perspective,
argues that there is a constant tension between civilization
and a regressive tendency towards ‘barbarism’, ‘social
morality winding up living in cynical cohabitation with a
destructiveness that no longer even tries to conceal itself
… hungry for immediate gratifications and intolerant of
any withholding of its needs or resistance’.
The public sphere
Xenophobia is at odds with the concept of a ‘public
sphere’ that enables groups to transcend difference and
come together in a shared sense of their common
humanity. Most influentially, Habermas offers us the idea
of the public sphere as ‘the ideal communication
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community’ (Bernstein, 1995, p. 1). His work presents ‘an
acute appreciation of social-political life as a
dialogical-communicative process’ based upon the
assumption of the possibility of communicative rationality
in the public sphere (Beiner, 2014, p. 132). Habermas
offers psychoanalysis as a model of this process, the
manifestation of an ideal speech situation leading to the
unlocking of human potential through working through
the neurotic fantasies that stifle human potential with an
appeal to the transformative power of reason.
For Habermas the challenge is to undo the iron cage of
administrative, purposive rationality that dominates and
reduces the human potential of human life. Here his work
builds upon Weber’s vision ‘of rationalization as
engendering a loss of meaning and value’
(Bernstein, 1995, p. 5). This loss can be challenged, he
suggests, by an emphasis upon the practice of a more
enlightened form of communicative rationality. From a
psychoanalytic perspective though, it is as or more likely
to be disrupted by an eruption of irrational fantasy. Rather
than the ideal of all members of society coming together to
engage in a shared dialogue about to create better practices
and organizations to improve our common life, society
fractures into separate interest groups characterized by
their own distinctive fantasies.
For many this Habermasian vision of the potential of
the public sphere is utopian and unrealizable
(Calhoun, 1992) while the discontents discussed by
Freud (2004) continue to dominate private and public life.
One can retain Habermas’s (1987) ambition of achieving
forms of social dialogue based upon a conception of
communicatively mediated knowledge creation while
also, in our view reasonably, suggesting that the capacity
of many participants, including leaders, to make value
claims based on the attainment of intersubjective
recognition seems, regrettably, in short supply. It is the
psychic conditions that limit this supply that we focus on
in the theoretical part of this paper, illustrating this
shortage in debates leading up to Brexit.
Habermas (1987, p.315) suggests that it is ‘the
unfettered imperatives of the economic and administrative
subsystems’, dominated by an Anglo-Saxon capitalist
ethos, and their cognitive-instrumental orientation that
limit the potential of dialogue in the public sphere. We
suggest that it is also the unconscious of individuals and
society that is equally limiting, expressing itself, as in
Brexit, in an irrationally driven challenge to the claims
of scientific expertise and knowledge. The possibilities
of communicative, intersubjective rationality are limited
in two ways: the myopic rationality of a particular form
of modernization (cognitive-instrumental) and the
irrational fantasies driven by Freudian discontents.
Castoriadis (1997) is less idealistic than Habermas in
this analysis of the possibilities of the public sphere,
linking this to a social psychoanalytic perspective on the
tension between private and public and a crisis of the
‘social imaginary’. Quoting Freud’s view that neurosis
has its origin in the flight from an unsatisfying reality into
the vicarious pleasures afforded by fantasy,
Castoriadis (2005) argues the individual’s relationship to
the public sphere reflects the experience of what is
perceived as the violence that prevents full realization of
private desire. This tension/unconscious war between the
public and the private is a clash of what Castoriadis (2011,
pp. xvi–xvii) theorizes as ‘two imaginary significations:
autonomy and “rational mastery”’.
Social crisis is the result of a ‘crisis in social imaginary
significations’, especially the ‘capitalist imaginary of
unlimited production and consumption’ in which the
active citizen has been replaced by the hyperactive
consumer. The background to this is a social imaginary
that reflects a reality that ‘[o]n the factual level the
essential features of public affairs are still the private affair
of various groups and clans that share effective power,
decisions are made behind closed doors, the little that is
brought onto the public stage is masked, prefabricated,
and belated to the point of irrelevancy’ (Castoriadis, 1997,
p. 407).
The unconscious of Brexit
A central argument of psychoanalysis is that fantasy,
desire and social order/disorder are deeply entangled
(Elliott, 1996). We illustrate this argument with respect
to Brexit, suggesting that fantasy and desire conspired
among Brexit supporters and their leaders resulting in
the disruptive change of the UK’s exit from the EU.
Stein (2016) analyses European monetary union as a
‘fantasy of fusion’ in which a key desire was to heal the
trauma of the Second World War. Our analysis suggests
that Brexit was, in part, driven by a fantasy of liberation
from fusion, linked to xenophobic displacement activity
which found a convenient scapegoat in the EU and, in
particular, its open borders, for undermining the history,
identity and purity of the UK. Blame for our current
discontent was projected onto the EU and its perceived
beneficiaries, for example, immigrant labour, and this
served as a convenient distraction from accepting personal
responsibility for our own shortcomings and also seeing
the benefits of EU membership.
Our analysis of Brexit is text-based (Gephart, 1993).
We draw inspiration for this from critical discourse
analysis (Fairclough, 2013) which was developed to
examine the social and political significance of texts.
Critical discourse analysis interrogates discourse as forms
of social practice, comparing its expression at different
contexts, for example, ‘the situation, the institutional
context, and the wider societal context’ (Fairclough, 1993,
p. 137). First, we locate the Brexit ‘debate’ in terms of its
socio-historical context of deeply-rooted fantasy of British
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nationhood. Next, we look at the discourses of Brexit
leaders preceding the UK referendum. Finally, we look
at the motivations of two different groups of Brexit voters,
the affluent white older conservatives of the UK ‘home
counties’ located in the South-East of England, and the
working class voters of the industrial north, particularly
the North East.
Fantasies of a once greater nation. The unconscious of a
nation is reflected in the stories it tells itself, the myths it
propagates to bolster its sense of self, its culture and its
telling and retelling of its history. Historically, there has
always been a great deal of scepticism and even hostility
in the UK about EU membership. The UK as a union of
nations voted collectively to leave the EU with the desire
to leave being more concentrated in England and Wales.
Pro-European UK political leaders acknowledged, from
the outset, that arguments for greater integration with
Europe had to address a deep-rooted English xenophobia.
In the 1960s, when a Conservative government under
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was working towards
closer integration with Europe, the view in government
was that ‘the xenophobic tendencies of the British could
be reined in and their patriotism made to incorporate a
sense of Europeanness’ through an appeal to idealism
(Weight, 2002, p. 350).
There was little evidence of idealism during the Brexit
debate. For example, a key driver, exploited by those
leading the case for Brexit, was the anxiety of many in
the UK that drove their attitude towards immigration and
the many forms of negative projections onto this ‘alien’
group (Fortier, 2017). A discourse of xenophobia was
used, no longer as a weapon of last resort, but as a first line
of attack, signifying what many saw as a ‘race to the
bottom’ in the lead to Brexit (Thränhardt, 1995). Brexit
brought to the fore deep-rooted anxieties about Britishness
and its place in the world. The EU was a convenient
scapegoat for UK projections onto others of blame for
its decline.
Brexit saw strident claims for English exceptionalism
and greatness – it is, after all Great Britain – used as a
weapon project imbued with nationalist and sometimes
explicit racist fervour. This was a fantasy that refused to
come to terms with what leading historian of Britishness,
Strong (2011, pp. 208, 12) describes, as the reality that
‘we have to face up to the truth that we are the inheritors
of an idea of empire that no longer has any substance in
reality […] Today Britannia no longer rules the waves –
and with that we have yet to come to terms’.
Strong (2011) argues that an ‘imperial mythology’ has
been crucial in constructing a strong discourse of English
identity, harking back as it does to the days of empire and
to victory in the Second World War, which still exerts a
strong pull on the imagination of many. Older voters are
particularly imbued with this belief and they were a key
Brexit-voting group. The idea of empire rather than
Europe also remains particularly strong among this group
despite evidence of the unequivocal decline in British
imperial power and its national competitive performance
on a number of economic indices including productivity.
In this discourse, there is a constant replaying of stories
of the glories of history and tradition, examples of British
greatness including being a victor in the Second World
War (Hennessy, 2019). ‘Britons never ever shall be slaves’
is an old English nostrum that supports ideas such as
national sovereignty, free trade and liberation from
stifling, wasteful EU bureaucracy and legislation.
As Jeremy Kinsman (2016), former Canadian High
Commissioner in London, argued, in any referendum over
separation – and, of course, Canada has significant
experience of this – the ‘independence’ side appeals to
the ‘patriotic heart’:
The thinking of the Leave side is magical. It plucks at a
dimly remembered but glorified past (that was never as
good as nostalgia makes it) and offers a future that is
imaginary … appeals to the nation’s head did not get
through. In a post-factual political age, reasoning does
not reach the heart. To win, you needed to mobilize
convincing passion behind the case that the status quo
is both preferable and improvable.
Brexit spoke to British fantasies of exceptional power and
heroic British individuals, quintessentially represented in
the seminal figure of Winston Churchill, regularly voted
Britain’s greatest ever leader. The Second World War
continues to cast a long shadow over the UK and forms
a key reference point of national consciousness with older
generations stuck in what Weight (2002, p. 345) describes
as a ‘cultural bunker’. The myth of Churchill is of an
heroic leader singlehandedly saving the world from Nazi
domination and this remains one of the great British epics.
There is in this a fantasy of omnipotence, the
unquestioning and unquestionable ability to control our
own destiny irrespective of outside forces. History is
appealed to as evidence of a special British destiny.
Liberated again from the oppression of foreign powers,
in the case of Brexit, the EU, the fantasy is that we will
be free to regain our former glories. This omnipotence,
with its echoes of imperial greatness, refuses to come to
terms with the lessons of history, wallows in nostalgia
for a lost past, and presents a golden future in which a
renewed nation resumes its lost global role as “Britannia
Unchained” (Kwarteng et al., 2012) as depicted by
leading Brexit supporting Conservative politicians.
Leaders stoke the flames with xenophobic discourse. A
psychoanalytic perspective suggests that leadership can
sometimes be construed as an exercise in ‘exploiting
primary dependencies’ and that, in their need to belong,
followers ‘subject’ themselves to leaders’ discourse which
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trades on their ‘primary vulnerability’ (Butler, 1997,
p. 20). There were two main groups campaigning for
Brexit. One was led by a group of politicians, mainly
Conservative, under the leadership of two government
ministers, Boris Johnson and Michael Gove. The other
prominent group on the Leave side of the argument was
Leave.EU, led by a member of the European Parliament
(MEP) and leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP),
Nigel Farage.
Johnson and Farage are classic exponents of what has
been described as the ‘post-truth’ ideological strategy
(McIntyre, 2018), asserting one’s own sense of truth
supremacy, thus reinforcing one’s own sense of
omnipotence, by persuading people to believe you, even
if the evidence suggests otherwise. In the Referendum
Vote Leave leaders emphasized all the negatives they
could find, or create, to denigrate the role of the EU
(Clarke et al., 2017). The Remain camp argued, rationally
and rather politely, for the status quo, largely on economic
grounds, warning against the economic damage Brexit
might cause and claiming that the UK would be ‘Stronger
In’. The Leave campaigners were much more extreme and
emotional in their arguments. First, they labelled the entire
Remain campaign as ‘Project Fear’. Second, they played
their trump card of xenophobia, focusing on what they
claimed was the threat of large-scale immigration as a
result of the EU’s policy of freedom of movement, one
of the EU’s foundational principles. They denigrated their
opponents for stoking ‘fear’ unjustly, while themselves
exploiting their own supporters’ fear and anger.
Johnson, a future PrimeMinister and then most popular
member of the Conservative Party for his flamboyant
appeal to traditional Conservative voters, not least because
of his anti-EU stance, played a pivotal role in the Brexit
campaign. His expression of support for Brexit was a
seminal event. It is credited by many as being the key
factor in creating a majority vote for Leave. In the
campaign, Johnson felt enabled to resort to racial
stereotyping and harking back to the atrocities of the
Second World War, warning against ‘a
Gestapo-controlled Nazi EU’, while re-igniting the long
cherished British mythic conception of itself as the hero
of two world wars, which, perversely, had their origins
in Europe. In this biased conception of military history
Britain had stood alone and was the key force in returning
freedom to a continent ravaged by war. Part of Johnson’s
appeal was to a particular form of English nationalism,
which resonated strongly with many areas of the UK.
According to Shipman (2017, p. 181), Johnson became
‘the embodiment of the nation’, at least for those whowere
anti-EU. He also became the emblem of a form of British
nationalism that Remain campaigners were trying to
resist.
Johnson had history in Europe. He had started his
career as a political journalist. As EU correspondent for
the Daily Telegraph, a fiercely anti-EU newspaper owned
by (allegedly) tax exile billionaires, Johnson’s dispatches
from Brussels (Johnson, 2003) became legend due to the
comic vigour of his prose, his propensity for exaggeration
and his cavalier approach to the truth, always at the
expense of the EU’s image in the UK (Gimson, 2016).
Entertaining fiction sells newspapers and Johnson’s was
particularly popular among the affluent middle-class
home counties readership of theDaily Telegraph. Johnson
regaled his readers with comic vignettes about the EU
desire to regulate staples of the British diet such as
sausages and bananas. ‘The bigger the lie and the more
frequently it was repeated the more it was believed’
(MacShane, 2016, p. 10). Clarke (2017, p. 353) says of
Johnson’s reports for the Daily Telegraph that they ‘were
often nearer to fiction than reality’
The other key leadership figure in the Brexit story was
Nigel Farage. A former commodity trader, he helped
found then became a member of the European Parliament
(MEP) for the UK Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP was
established with only one aim – to get the UK out of
Europe. As its leader, Farage progressively refined
UKIP’s anti-EU stance to include hostility towards
large-scale immigration from the EU. Like Johnson,
Farage came to enjoy an intense popularity and loyalty
among his followers. Under Farage’s leadership UKIP,
although a single-issue organization, became a powerful
political force in the UK. Indeed, one of the main reasons
for agreeing to a Referendumwas the then Prime Minister
David Cameron’s conviction that if he did not agree to this
the Conservative Party would lose political ground on the
right to UKIP.
Like Johnson, Farage extolled the unique virtues and
power of the UK, the ability to stand alone, against the
world if necessary, backed by appeals to an extreme brand
of patriotism. This argument was encapsulated in the
message of ‘Taking back control’ and the fantasy that we
are ‘Stronger alone’. What was most striking about the
Farage-led campaign was its unremitting focus on the
toxic issue of immigration. The official Leave campaign
had overemphasized the likelihood of Turkey joining the
EU as a full member in the near future, something that
most commentators accepted was unlikely. This was
interpreted as a veiled reference to problems of
immigration from new EU accession countries. Farage
was more explicit and emphasized what he argued were
the detrimental effects of uncontrolled immigration on
the life chances of the British people, undermining
services and stealing employment opportunities. It was
claimed, for example, that towns felt besieged by
large-scale immigration and that Britain was being
‘swamped’ by overseas benefit claims.
There was no evidence to support the latter claim but in
a post-truth environment there is a tendency to believe
what we want to believe and to disbelieve what expert
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opinion suggests is more fact-based, a case of what
Thompson (2016, p. 211) describes as the ‘pollution of
meanings’. A low point of the Brexit campaign for many
was Farage unveiling posters about immigration,
including an image of a long stream of migrants at the
Croatian–Slovenian border under the slogan ‘Breaking
Point’. As Freud (2004) points out, a key feature of
self-aggrandizement and the lust for power is to blame
others for our own failings and use the other as a
convenient focus for scapegoat aggression.
Unscrupulous leaders cynically exploit the emotions of
their supporters. Former EU President Jean-Claude
Juncker (Stone, 2019) later regretted that he did not
intervene more forcefully during the Brexit campaign to
challenge the ‘bullshit’ and ‘lies’ spread by ‘Boris Johnson
and others’. It is also reported that President Macron of
France described Brexiteers as ‘anger-mongers backed
by fake news’ peddling lies and irresponsibility. This is a
key tactic of those who exploit xenophobia. They prey
on the grief and anger that stems from loss of various
kinds and the melancholia and anger that loss creates.
Leaders lead their followers with an irrational promise, a
fantasy of regaining that which was lost, presented, in
the case of Brexit, in a discourse of individual and national
pride. They normalize anger at loss and paranoia that the
other presents an existential threat, channelling it through
xenophobia into a positive sense of hope for the future if
only the threat can be eradicated. Because the other is
presented as a threat and even as dehumanized, certainly
not one of us, leaders vindicate negative emotions and
absolve followers of guilt for their anger and expressions
of hostility which is felt as a form of liberation.
Paranoia and narcissism combine to create the perfect
xenophobic storm. ‘Xenological’ discourse (Schick, 1999,
p. 10) signals out the stranger, the other, as source of our
trauma and as its solution if we can exorcize his/her
baleful presence. In Brexit it was the unconscious psychic
life of its most fervent supporters through which political
leaders channelled emotions of anxiety and anger into
the Leave vote through appealing to latent xenophobia.
Ethno-nationalists make their case around mantra such
as ‘Take back our country’ or, in UK reaction about the
growing integration of the EU as a political entity, ‘Take
back control’, regain sovereign power.
A tale of two social groups. The expression of xenophobia
was made almost respectable in the discourse of some
pro-Brexit politicians and by some sections of the
right-leaning media and ran wild on social media
(Sveinnson, 2009; Gillborn, 2010; Rzepnikowska, 2019).
Xenophobic behaviour is particularly attributed to white
youth and a racist working class. However, xenophobia
also manifested itself in a more genteel way in the affluent
generally older conservative population, inhabitants of the
South-East of England home counties, with a particular
form of national pride rooted in its own view of
English/British history. Johnson’s journalism, for example
appealed to particularly the latter group who read the
Daily Telegraph and this reinforced their fantasy image
of the EU as a rapacious, out of control anti-UK beast
committed to total control of its nation members. Leaving
the EU would magically allow Great Britain to rediscover
and reassert its intrinsic greatness and, once again, repel
unwanted foreign invasion.
While the Leave vote was high among older more
affluent Conservative voters harking after a Great Britain
that they thought they remembered and that they feared
they had lost, support for Brexit was also high among
the economically disadvantaged, less educated and poorer
voters in regions such as the North East of England, who
had sufferedmost from de-industrialization (Hobolt, 2016;
Colotone and Stanig, 2018). For this group recent history
had been a time of change and dwindling economic
fortunes, with the decline in traditional working class jobs
and austerity eating into the provision and quality of
state-provided public services. Social groups who feel
themselves threatened by immigration, for example,
linking it to decrease in job opportunities, access to
housing and welfare and other services, are a key target
for xenophobia and racist ideology (Wrench and
Solomos, 1993).
From a psychodynamic perspective, as traditional
forms of work, particularly industrial manual work, are
replaced by more precarious and less well-paid jobs, the
consequence can be a deep sense of both loss and
impotence which finds expression in rage against those
identified as perpetrators of your harm. People experience
a challenge to their sense of identity that manifests itself in
both anxiety and anger. The EU is a convenient target,
portrayed as the enemy ‘forever exposing them to a
relentless downward pressure on their living standards in
the name of market opening competition, privatization
and austerity cuts in social provision’ (MacShane, 2016,
p. 15). This exacerbates the sense of grievance and
impotence that has arisen, at least in part, due to the
perception of Britain having an unending and large
redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich
(Gilmour, 1992). In the regions, it was the case for Brexit
that ignited passions and fantasies of revenge as the
apparently disenfranchized took their cues from what
Kinsman (2016) describes as populist identity-driven
nativists with xenophobic views such as that immigrants’
sole aims are ‘to exploit the social benefits of the state or
destroy its core values’ (Arrocha, 2019, p. 245).
Discussion/conclusion
Our first conclusion is that we need to become more
willing to consider the role of the unconscious in
Xenophobia and Brexit 7
© 2021 The Authors
European Management Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Academy of Management
(EURAM).
individual, social and public life. Particularly in relation to
dysfunctional thinking and behaviour, such as
xenophobia, individuals, organizations and institutions
are not the rational entities that many like to believe. An
engagement with the unconscious sources of emotions,
values, desires and fantasies can promote deeper
consideration of the barriers to the rational modes of
behaviour that many aspire to. This gives us deeper insight
into the unconscious barriers so resistant to change. Such
understanding is necessary if we are to counter the
‘illusions of self-foundation, necessity and universality’
that so many of us identify with and to promote ‘new
political objectives and new human attitudes’
(Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 35–43). As Habermas argues,
social life is not only ‘a set of objective processes capable
of being mastered from an objectifying standpoint’
(Beiner, 2014, p. 143). In its fullest expression, it is
created out of inter-subjectivity, communicative agency
and dialogue about how to improve our social practices
and institutions.
Psychoanalysis belongs to ‘the same emancipatory
project as democracy and philosophy’ (Rockhill, 2011,
p. xx) not least in its role of explaining why the
Habermasian ideal of the public sphere is so difficult to
achieve, revealing beneath the veneer of rationality in
individual and public life the role of the unconscious,
not least in the service of power. Beneath a discourse of
instrumental rationality, as Castoriadis (1997) argues,
there exists the pervasive influence of the social
imaginary. Beneath the appeal of Brexit, based on the
discourse of Great Britain reasserting its greatness lies
the lust for power of political leaders, the fantasies of both
an aging affluent population and marginal less affluent
groups focusing their fear and anger on alien government
and the threat of the immigrant other.
The alternative to these fantasies is to promote the
importance of ‘reflective subjectivity’ to encourage the
development of subjects ‘capable of calling into question
the imaginary significations of the society in which she
lives, and even the institutions of that society’, thus
expanding the psychic space of what is ‘thinkable’
(Castoriadis, 2007, pp. 219–220). For psychoanalysis
the goal is to facilitate a more autonomous subject,
recognizing that our goal of autonomy is indissociably
linked to and has to be pursued in the context of our
relationship to the freedom of others in which the goal
of autonomy is to create new meanings about how to
relate to each other (Castoriadis, 1991). The true
expression of autonomy depends upon the desire and the
ability to self-question, to challenge the rule of an
imaginary (Castoriadis, 2005; Bauman, 2001). The
autonomous subject is he/she who can bring into
consciousness that which is repressed and thus forge a
new relationship with self and other, with desire and
reality (Castoriadis, 2005).
A major concern of the father of psychoanalysis,
Sigmund Freud (2004), was the forces driving and
inhibiting civilization. Civilization, he concluded, is
constantly threatened with disintegration because we
frequently indulge in delusional behaviours that manifest
hostility to others. ‘The fateful question for the human
race’, Freud (2004, p. 74) argues, ‘seems to be whether,
and to what extent, the development of its civilization will
manage to overcome the disturbance of communal life
caused by the human drive for aggression and self-
destruction’. Freud identifies the tendency as ‘the greatest
obstacle to civilization’.
We see xenophobia as a classic ‘disturbance’ of the
possibility of communal life and, as such, a great ‘obstacle
to civilization’. For us xenophobia is primarily a psychic
phenomenon formed out of negative emotions and
fantasy. Psychodynamics, and within that psychoanalysis
analysis, suggests that the antidote to social disintegration
is to rekindle the capacity for reparation, to understand
better the fear and anger that undermine relationships with
others, ‘to bring the relationship back to life, and to protect
self and other from further unacceptable aggressive and
destructive wishes … generated through the defensive
use of omnipotent thinking, idealization, denial and,
crucially, projective identification’ (Elliott, 1996, p.78).
This is easier said than done and requires leaders capable
of focusing people’s attention on a more positive future
that does not involve the denigration of others, leaders
who promote a discourse of inclusion rather than
separation and exclusion. This involves relinquishing
fantasies of an ideal world based on simple
one-dimensional notions of good and bad. It also requires
the ability to tolerate uncertainty and ambivalence
(Lapierre, 1989).
Klein (1986) argues that the ego has to learn to trust
more in the benevolence of others and to control our
own tendency to do harm to others. This is not an easy
process, involving as it does the withdrawal of
identification with fantasy objects. Klein (1975) also
argues that it is in the drive to make reparation, to repair
the damages done and the cleavages created, that makes
hope for the future prevail and grounds our ability to
create a better future than can come from any fantasy of
omnipotence. Boris Johnson used Brexit to further his
long-held ambition of becoming UK Prime Minister,
something he finally achieved in 2019.
One conclusion of our paper is that we can only resolve
our current dilemmas if we have leaders who are capable
of bringing people together, focused not on creating
discord but on reparation and the healing of divisions for
a common good. Until then fantasy is likely to prevail.
In such a context, the common public interest, mediated
by a variety of institutions and organizations in public
and private sectors, is perceived as controlled by sectional
interests, political or economic. A critical task of our time
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for political and business leaders is to re-establish trust in
such an order, changing its structures when necessary to
achieve this, thus promoting positive emotions of
reality-based pride and achievement rather than failure
and prejudice. Habermas’s emphasis on communicative
rationality and more ethical discourse does provide an
important touchstone and aspiration for political
democracy and other forms of organization
(Bernstein, 1995).
As management educators we link this to the
importance of education. Leadership and management
education needs to be based less on disseminating ‘rules’
for technical competence, many of them based on
fantasies of reason and control, and more on cultivating
reflectiveness, ‘an openness to our ethical and moral
capacity to tolerate difference and otherness; which in turn
implicates the imagination, the bringing in of the human
element … to the point where knowledge is turned back
upon itself to examine its presuppositions, thus allowing
room to unearth the contradictions of the established
social order’ (Elliott, 1996, p. 93). Universities have been
central to the Western discourse of the university and the
public good. When Harvard Business School was
established, it was justified as enhancing the capacity of
the university for public good. However, in recent years,
business schools have been criticized for putting private
gain above public purpose (Khurana, 2007). As
Nussbaum (1998) points out, liberal education is about
developing the ability to think critically and reflexively
about ourselves and others, based on respect for the
humanity of others. One of the educational tragedies of
our time is, as Nussbaum also argues, is that education
has become too focused on technical competence and
employability at the expense of respect for humanity. We
need to integrate technical competence and humanity with
education that aligns public and private interests and leads
to better outcomes in terms of public value (Moore, 1995).
We need to disabuse our leaders, in public and private
sectors, that there are easy answers to complex problems
(Heifetz, 1998).
We need to take history more seriously and conduct
research to investigate why the past is not better used as
a source of and a resource for learning. Andress (2018)
describes the refusal to engage with history as driven by
emotional forces and political convenience. Adorno and
Horkheimer (1997) capture the underlying dynamic of
this situation, arguing that we face a situation in which
individuals, because they know that honest conversation
is difficult or impossible, perversely use all the resources
at their disposal to ensure that there is no proper
conversation. A discourse of economic necessity
proliferates without critical reflection on the fact that this
is one expression of a particular discourse of the dominant
social imaginary and not, necessarily, the best or the most
useful form of discourse.
The role of the business school and management
education in contributing to a public sphere in which
‘practical reason [is] institutionalized through norms of
reasoned discourse in which arguments, not statuses or
traditions, [are] decisive’ (Calhoun, 1992, p. 2) is an
important issue for urgent consideration. A public sphere
thus constituted has the potential to be a powerful force
for social integration based upon a people developed and
public use of their reason to address complex social
challenges through a shared commitment to practical
reason (Habermas, 1989). Reason itself achieves greater
competence in the process. Habermas (1989)
acknowledges the degeneration of the public sphere in
contemporary mass consumer society but it is not clear
how Habermas’s theory is practically useful in allowing
us to discuss the ideal of a more just, more rational
democracy based on a more vibrant and integrative public
sphere (Hohendahl, 1989). We suggest that such a project
will involve greater engagement with the theory of the
unconscious and its expression as a means towards how
we can better channel its energy productively and mitigate
its destructive potential. We contribute to our
understanding of xenophobia and the role of
psychodynamic forces within the public sphere by
highlighting the key role of the unconscious and its ability
to be influenced by leaders. Freud (2004) argues that a
clash between barbarism and civilization lies at the very
heart of the collective unconscious. Without taking this
seriously and a collective attempt in the public sphere to
counter it, xenophobia will only increase.
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